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Hawala: criminal haven or vital financial network? 
  
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, American authorities prepared to wage war on terror on 
both financial and military fronts. As the Taliban fled Kabul in the face of advancing 
American forces, U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill announced he was forging a global 
alliance through which ‘we are going to pursue the financiers of terrorism like they’ve never 
been pursued before’. His target, however, was as shadowy as al-Qaida itself: the informal 




Well before the events of 9/11, a 
modernised version of the ancient system 
of value transfer known in Arabic as 
hawala (exchange, especially of debt) had 
begun to play a significant role in financial 
transactions throughout the Islamic world. 
Widely used by migrant workers of 
Muslim origin as a cheap and convenient 
means of remitting their savings to their 
families back home, Hawaladars – most of 
whom identify themselves as running 
money transmission businesses – can be 
found operating at the heart of virtually 
every ethnic colony which Asian migrant 
workers have established in Europe, North 
America and the oil-rich parts of the 
Middle East. Equipped with little more 
than a telephone, computer and fax 
machine, often in the corner of an inner-
city store selling anything from cheap 
tickets to groceries to a largely migrant 
clientele, Hawaladars guaranteed delivery 
to recipients within 48 hours, no matter 
how remote the destination at a fraction of 
the cost charged by more fomally 
constituted agencies such as Western 
Union, and to a far wider range of 
destinations. Cash deliveries to remote 
valleys in the Pir Panjal, the mountains of 
the North West Frontier Province, let alone 
to war-torn Afghanistan and Somalia cause 
no problems. A similar system used by 
Chinese migrants is called fei-chien, 
‘flying money’ – an apt description of 
Hawala’s wonders.  
‘Underground banking’ 
Hawala is big business: millions of dollars 
a day flow through this global value 
transfer system. Prior to 9/11 few outsiders 
were even aware of the existence of the 
system; fewer still knew how it worked. 
Hence when there was an instant panic 
about all things Islamic in the aftermath of 
the assault on the twin towers, Hawala was 
suddenly outed as a form of ‘underground 
banking’. But this was clearly banking 
with a difference. For those accustomed to 
the clerical procedures of formally 
constituted banks and their mounds of 
documentation – cheques, deposit receipts, 
account statements, transaction summaries 
– Hawala operations appeared to operate 
on an impossibly casual basis, and hence 
to be wide open to exploitation by 
terrorists and other malefactors.  
 
Hawala is indeed an ‘informal’ system by 
contemporary Euro-American standards. 
Relying wherever possible on trust rather 
than written contracts to guarantee the 
security of their transactions, and only 
transmitting the data needed to implement 
the transaction in question, hawaladars 
deploy conventional banking procedures 
of consolidation, settlement, and 
deconsolidation. But they do so in such a 
way that record-keeping is reduced to the 
bare minimum, thereby saving whole 
forests of paper as well as huge amounts of 
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clerical and administrative effort. Whilst 
this ‘lean and mean’ approach to business 
practice dramatically reduces overheads, 
and hence the cost of transactions, it also 
has an alarming consequence as afar as 
regulators are concerned. Such operations 
appear to be un-auditable, at least by 
conventional standards: hence in the moral 
panic which followed 9/11, Hawala was 
routinely described as ‘a system without 
records’.  
 
Much of this was empty hype. Careful 
inspection reveals that Hawaladars do keep 
records of amounts to be delivered and of 
recipient names and addresses: there is no 
way in which Hawaladar could reliably 
run their huge and complex operation 
without recording such essential data. 
However it was not the store-front 
Hawaladars’ front-office practices which 
stumped outside observers, but rather the 
back-office procedures they utilised to 
engineer the transfer of funds to remote 
destinations, culminating in physical cash 
deliveries. Making funds available 
overseas by conventional means is 
normally a fairly complex financial 
operation, which is why banks charge a 
substantial commission for their services. 
How could ‘backstreet’ Hawaladars 
implement such an operations so much 
more cheaply? Many sceptical observers 
promptly smelled a rat.  
Terrorist finance? 
Whilst the American military began to 
round up ‘illegitimate combatants’ in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere as post-9/11 
hysteria took off, the US Treasury 
Department took aim at the illegitimate 
financial networks by means of which 
terrorists were believed to support 
terrorists. When the American embassies 
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were 
bombed three years earlier, the US 
authorities alleged that al-Qaida operatives 
responsible had received funds through 
local Hawaladars. On the grounds that 
those responsible for the 9/11 atrocities 
must surely have done the same, American 
authorities soon found a target: the al-
Barakaat network, the principal means 
through which members of the Somali 
global diaspora supported their kinsfolk 
back home. The network was promptly 
closed down, and all its identifiable assets 
were confiscated, despite vociferous 
protests by those involved, to the effect 
that al-Barakaat had a wholly legitimate 
function, and that the cash remitted by 
émigrés had kept the entire Somali 
economy afloat for the past decade. Much 
later, it emerged that suggestions that al-
Barakaat was the underground banking 
arm of al-Qaida turned out to be largely 
specious. The 9/11 Commission eventually 
revealed that the bulk of funds used to 
finance the Twin Towers operation were 
channelled through the Suntrust Bank in 
Venice, Florida, where two of the 
perpetrators opened an account on an 
entirely conventional basis.i 
 
The PATRIOT Act and KYC 
However in no way did absence of 
concrete evidence preclude either legal or 
executive action in heated post 9/11 
political climate. Within six months 
Congress passed the Patriot Act, fully 
entitled: Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism. Among its many draconian 
measures it introduced was a requirement 
for all US-based financial institutions to 
bring practices into compliance with 
reinforced Anti-Money Laundering and 
Countering Terrorist Finance (AML/CFT) 
regulations promulgated by yet another 
US-sponsored agency, the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). 
These not only required US financial 
institutions to monitor the financial 
transactions of all their own customers, but 
also to ensure that every other financial 
institution with which they did business – 
including those operating elsewhere in the 
world – had taken similar steps to comply 
with AML/CFT requirements.ii  
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The purpose of the whole exercise was 
quite clear. In pursuing their self-declared 
‘war on terror’, US strategists aimed not 
only to detect and sweep up terrorists 
wherever in the globe they might seek to 
conceal themselves, but to perform exactly 
the same operation with respect to the 
financial flows which were deemed to 
support their terroristic activities. Given 
the status of the U.S. dollar as the 
globally-preferred unit of exchange, no 
major financial institution in the world 
could afford to ignore the new provisions 
if they wanted to continue routing 
transactions through New York’s markets 
– as they had to be able to do in order to 
stay in business.iii The U.S. Treasury 
clearly felt it had the enemy cornered. 
 
In achieving this goal, a key feature of the 
whole exercise was Know Your Customer 
(KYC) requirements, which required all 
front-line institutions to check out the 
identity of all their customers to ensure 
that they were neither criminals nor 
terrorists, and that any funds they 
deposited were ‘clean’ rather than ‘dirty’, 
on pain of the imposition of multi-million 
dollar fines. FinCEN’s main objective was 
to firewall the global financial system. If 
all institutions complied with its new 
requirements, of which KYC was the key, 
criminally acquired funds would be unable 
to penetrate the legitimate financial 
marketplace. ‘Clean’ money would 
consequently continue to circulate freely, 
while the ‘dirty’ money generated by drug 
smugglers, criminals and terrorists would 
stagnate outside the firewall, from where it 
could at least in principle be mopped up by 
authorities.iv  
 
At least in principle, the new regulations 
did not ban Hawala networks. They simply 
demanded conformity to AML/CFT, KYC 
and other financial services industry 
regulations. Hence the US authorities have 
had great success in closing down 
‘terrorist’ networks on the grounds that 
they had operated in breach of regulatory 
requirements. Many European 
Governments took the same sceptical view 
of Hawala networks.v  
 
At first these initiatives appeared to have 
the desired effect. Faced with the possible 
sequestration of informal sector transfers, 
many migrants switched to the more 
expensive services of formally constituted 
banks and Western Union to send money 
home. The results were spectacular: in 
Pakistan, for example, the formally 
recorded annual inflow of migrant 
remittances rose from US$1.1 billion in 
2001 to US$4.2 billion in 2004.vi Since 
then, however, formal channel inflow has 
slackened, and no evidence suggests the 
end of informal networks. The latest 
World Bank estimates suggest the annual 
global flow of migrant remittances through 
formal channels in 2005 exceeded $233 
billion worldwide, of which developing 
countries received $167 billion. 
Unrecorded flows moving through 
informal channels push the total far higher, 
as they are conservatively estimated to 
amount to at least 50% percent of recorded 
flows.vii 
It follows that Informal Value Transfer 
Systems – of which Hawala is best 
regarded as the Indian Ocean exemplar of 
an even more global phenomenon are still 
very much in business. Wherever possible 
they have adjusted their practices – or at 
least the way in which they represent them 
– to comply with AML/CFT regulations. 
In doing so they have taken every possible 
advantage of local variations, given that 
different countries have interpreted AML 
requirements in varying ways. In Britain, 
for example, Customs inspectors have 
confined their attention to front-office 
KYC compliance proceduresviii in 
keeping with FinCEN’s ‘firewall’ policy. 
However inspectors rarely, if ever, 
consider the back-office procedures 
deployed by those engaged in trans-
national and trans-currency value 
transmission; as a result most hawaladars 
have now registered as licensed Money 
Service Businesses. In France, Germany 
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and Holland those seeking to operate such 
businesses are required to register as 
banks, with all the associated regulatory 
consequences. Hence those engaged in the 
business have no alternative but to keep 
their heads well below the parapet. In 
other words the Patriot Act has certainly 
not killed off Hawala: having made 
suitable adjustments to the requirements of 
specific local circumstances, the whole 
operation continues to thrive.  
The operation of contemporary hawala 
networks  
In a post-9/11 climate of fear and 
suspicion, news of the existence of a 
system which supports a multi-billion 
dollar flow of funds through informal 
channels on a global scale precipitates 
instant paranoia, especially in the form of 
alarmist stories about the way in which the 
system enables criminals, drug smugglers 
and terrorists to run wild. But before 
jumping to conclusions, it is worth 
examining the evidence. Does it 
necessarily follow that the excellent terms 
which hawaladars offer their migrant-
worker customers is solely the result of the 
large premiums which criminal and 
terrorists are prepared to pay to get their 
hands on ‘clean’ dollars? Or is it because 
hawaladars have devised a highly efficient 
means of long-distance value transfers 
with which more formally constituted 
institutions find themselves unable to 
compete?  
From their customers’ perspective, the 
most attractive dimension of Hawala-style 
delivery systems is their capacity to 
respond to their requirements for financial 
services swiftly and cheaply, and at a 
fraction of the cost charged by Western 
Union or Travelex. Using hawala, 
customers depositing cash in any one 
country and currency can expect a sum of 
similar value in local currency to reach the 
specified destination in another country, 
including remote rural locations, within 48 
hours. How do Hawaladars pull this off? 
Above all as a result of the efficiency of 
their back-office procedures, such that 
their overhead costs are dramatically lower 
than those of their formal sector rivals.  
 
These costs have two major components. 
Firstly that of moving raw cash from place 
to place; Hawaladars seek to reduce these 
costs in the same way as all other financial 
operators, by turning cash it into value – 
financial instruments that can be 
consolidated, traded and de-consolidated at 
will. But whilst information can be 
transmitted far more cheaply than cash, 
information processing also costs money: 
this is the second source of overheads. As 
we shall see, hawaladars, like banks, still 
sometimes find it necessary to implement 
the physical transfer currency notes 
between themselves. However just as in 
the formal banking sector, the greater part 
of hawala is conducted at a more abstract 
level, since it involves the transfer of value 
rather than of cash from one location to 
another. The more efficiently these 
transfers can be implemented, the lower 
the overheads.  
 
The implementation of value transmission 
is not a matter of physical logistics, but 
rather of the transmission and processing 
of information – which is one reason why 
recent developments in communications 
technology have had such a far-reaching 
impact on the global financial services 
industry. In a comprehensively wired 
world, digital data can be instantly 
transmitted to anyone with access to a 
telephone, whether a land-line, mobile 
phone or satellite link. Hawaladars have 
been no slouches in making the most of 
these developments. Indeed they owe their 
competitiveness in the field of 
transnational value transmission precisely 
to their success in marrying their ancient 
commercial art with the potentiality of 
modern communications technology.  
 
Hawala began life, it will be remembered, 
as an ‘exchange of debt’, most usually 
between hawaladars providing financial 
services to traders moving between 
spatially separated markets. Cooperating 
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hawaladars formed a coalition of 
reciprocity, such that they routinely 
honoured each other’s hundi – Bills of 
Exchange in conventional banking 
terminology. To long distance traders, the 
hawaladars’ services were of great utility, 
since a hundi could be encashed with no 
fuss by a hawaladar belonging to the same 
coalition in any other market which they 
might visit. This obviated to need for them 
to carry bullion – always vulnerable to  
depredations of thieves and pirates – to 
finance their activities. However the 
encashment of such hundis generated a 
complex network of debt between the 
many partners within the coalition, which 
were in due course settled in a series of 
swaps – hawala.  
 
Much has changed since the system 
originally emerged. After European 
powers finally established hegemony over 
the Indian Ocean region, Western-style 
banking houses came to dominate the 
greater part of mainline trade, such that 
hawala systems were pressed out to the 
economic periphery. However following 
the collapse of colonial power, a huge 
upsurge in long-distance migration from 
below, and above all radical improvements 
in communication technology, hawala 
networks have gained a new lease of life, 
especially since they have turned out to be 
particularly well suited to cope with the 
logistical challenge of delivering migrant 
remittances. ix 
 
Most migrants remit relatively small sums: 
rarely much more than a few hundred 
dollars. Their central requirement is that 
recipients should receive cash deliveries 
swiftly and reliably, even if they live in 
remote villages far beyond the banking 
frontier. For formally constituted banks, 
meeting the demands of such customers is 
an extremely challenging task. Their 
procedures are cumbersome and overheads 
substantial. Hence for small sums, 
migrants frequently find that between 15 
and 20% of their hard-earned cash 
disappears in transfer and delivery costs. 
Hawaladars use just the same system of 
consolidation, settlement (hawala) and 
deconsolidation as do mainstream banks. 
But by substituting the mainstream banks’ 
expensive formal procedures with 
‘informal’ reciprocities of trust, and by 
using a distributed system of information-
exchange (rather storing huger masses of 
date in expensive central registries) to 
implement long-distance value transfers, 
Hawaladars are able to respond to 
migrants’ financial services requirements 
far more cheaply than can their formally 
constituted rivals. Given that hawala 
networks offer a first class service at a low 
cost, the fact that labour migrants flock to 
use them should not be a cause of any 
surprise.x 
 
‘Informality’ and relationships of absolute 
trust 
To set the scene still further, it is worth 
emphasising that whilst Hawala and other 
similarly constituted IVTS networks are 
conventionally identified as ‘informal’, 
they are anything bit small-scale. The 
hawala swaps brokered on a daily basis in 
Dubai use tranches of value worth 
$100,000 as their minimum unit of account 
substantial multiples of which are 
exchanged in the process of brokering 
each hawala swap. Moreover it goes 
without saying that at this level physical 
settlement is not implemented through 
exchanges of currency notes: multi-
million-dollar transfers are settled using 
just the same facilities as those used by 
mainstream banks, up to and including the 
Swift network.  
 
The mega-deals of this kind brokered in 
Dubai, in which multiple tranches of 
£100,000 are exchanged between global 
hawaladars, are the highest level of 
consolidation within the hawala system. 
Each of these tranches of value is normally 
assembled by a consolidator operating at a 
local (national) level, at which the physical 
dimensions of hawala – including the 
physical transfer of currency notes – 
become much more readily compre-
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hensible. Hence these more local swaps 
provide a convenient arena within which 
to set out a (highly simplified) model of 
how coalitions of mutual trust provide 
hawaladar with the means of constructing 
dynamic alliances within which to 
implement some bewilderingly complex 
financial transactions. Hence the diagram 
in Figure 1 is a simplified (and anonym-
ised) illustration of how two parallel sets 
of consolidation and deconsolidation of 
funds in both Britain and Pakistan, 
together with a back-to-back swap of value 
between consolidating hawaladars can, 
amongst other things, facilitate transfer of 
funds from Pakistani settlers in Britain to 
their kinsfolk in Pakistan.  
 
The core of the operation – which is 
executed on a daily basis – is an agreement 
between two hawaladars to swap tranches 
of cash of the same value, one in Pounds 
sterling and the other in Pakistani rupees, 
as a means of implementing a multitude of 
smaller deals on behalf of their respective 
clients.xi Having agreed on an exchange 
rate (e.g. GBP 1 = PKR 100), the Britain-
based Hawaladar is in a position to swap 
£100,000 worth of orders from British 
based Pakistanis to deliver an equivalent 
sum of Rupees to their kinsfolk in northern 
Pakistan for 10 million rupees which his 
Karachi-based partner has accumulated 
from local businessmen in Pakistan, in 
return for and agreement to settle £100,000 
worth of invoices for goods they have 
imported from British suppliers. In these 
circumstances they implement a two-way 
international and inter-currency value-
swap by means of two parallel cash-swaps, 
in one of which £100,000 is physically 
transferred to the Karachi Hawaladar’s UK 
agent, which he uses to settle the Karachi 
businessmen’s invoices, whilst in the other 
the UK Hawaladar’s agent in Karachi 
arranges the despatch of the 10 million 
rupees in cash of which he has taken 
delivery the villages in northern Pakistan 





As Figure 1 illustrates, a large number of 
actors are involved in the transactions 
which lead up to, as well as those which 
are precipitated by this swap. The tranches 
of value which the two consolidators 
exchange are invariably the product of a 
myriad independently brokered deals and 
sub-deals negotiated by networks of agents 
and sub-agents, of which Figure 1 is a 
highly simplified model, which effectively 
‘pulses’ on a daily basis. Each time a deal 
is reached, information flows passing back 
and forth along the horizontal axis 
between UK and Pakistan gives rise to two 
matched, simultaneous and local flows of 
hard cash: in physical  terms pounds 
sterling reflecting value transmitted to 
Pakistan flow down along the vertical axis 
to recipients elsewhere in the UK, for 
whom it represents value transmitted from 
Pakistan; whilst on the other side of the 
diagram a movement of rupees of similar 
value moves from senders to recipients in 
Pakistan. However neither senders nor 
recipients are aware of just how this 
outcome has been achieved – anymore 
than customers extracting notes from 
ATMs have any idea as to just where the 
cash so delivered has actually come from. 
In both cases value transfer and cash 
delivery are handled at a back-office level, 
using techniques which are structurally 
similar in both cases. It is just that the 
hawaladars’ ‘informal’ procedures enable 
them to implement such exercises in 
financial engineering more efficiently and 
hence more cheaply than can mainstream 
banks.  
Should we be alarmed?  
That depends on the perspective which one 
adopts. What looks like a godsend from 
the viewpoint of migrant workers is indeed 
a cause for alarm for mainstream banks: 
the success of hawala networks cuts them 
out from a large volume of potentially 
profitable business. However that is not 
the principal focus of public concern: here 
the focus is whether such networks 
provide a financial haven for terrorists and 
drugs smugglers. That they could do in 
principle is quite clear. We already know 
that huge volumes of dirty money are 
currently being transmitted to through the 
formal banking system on a regular basis, 
regardless of AML/CFT requirements;xii it 
would be idle to suggest that IVTS 
networks are not open to similar forms of 
malfeasance. However this issue is not 
whether they might be being used for such 
purposes, but whether they are being used, 
and if so on what scale?   
As far as conspiracy theorists are 
concerned, such questions are hardly 
worth asking. The answer seems quite self 
evident. Uninterested in exploring just 
how it is that hawala networks actually 
operate, and bemused by suggestions that 
they might constitute a highly effective 
entrepreneurial initiative in the 
increasingly competitive global market-
place for financial services, they leap 
instead for easy answers. Hence, for 
example, FATF website unequivocally 
asserts that cash deliveries of the kind 
shown in the bottom left-hand quadrant of 
Figure 1 is are a classic example of 
process it describes as ‘cuckoo smurfing’, 
and goes on to identify as prima facie 
evidence of money laundering.xiii No other 
possible explanations are even considered.  
 
None of this is to suggest that money 
launderers do not or cannot utilise the 
services of hawala networks. It is certainly 
not beyond the bounds of possibility that 
some of those tranches of $100,000 are the 
proceeds of the sale of heroin. But is there 
any likelihood that all, or even the 
majority of them, are so generated? That 
seems unlikely in the extreme. No matter 
how great the profits of international drug-
smuggling may be, they are dwarfed by 
the scale of migrant remittances; and in 
any event is it at all likely that UK-based 
drug smugglers would wish to shelter the 
profits of the malfeasance in Pakistani 
rupees? All serious commentators appear 
to agree that they much prefer US dollars 
in formally constituted banks located in 
well-sheltered jurisdictions in the 
Caribbean.  
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That said, one cannot exclude the 
possibility that criminals, terrorists and 
drug smugglers will take advantage of 
those jurisdictions where no formally 
constituted banks currently operate. In 
Somalia and Afghanistan, for example, 
financial transactions of all kinds, from the 
most innocent to the most criminal, can 
indeed pass through Hawala networks. In 
more normal circumstances, however, 
Hawaladars would appear to have a direct 
interest in avoiding criminal activity. 
Coalitions of absolute trust depend on the 
reliability of their members and everyone 
their members do business with. Violated 
trust imperils the stability of the whole 
coalition and invites severe sanctions. 
Precisely because Hawaladars expect to 
maintain a personal relationship with their 
customers, and most especially those with 
whom they engage in large-scale 
transactions, they effectively maintain 
their own ‘know your customer’ scheme. 
They also have a personal interest in 
excluding dodgy dealers: failure to do so 
would inevitably imperils their position 
within the entire coalition.  
Ill-focussed blunderbusses or targeted 
stilettos? 
Nobody denies the need for authorities to 
do everything in their power to contain the 
activities of terrorism’s financiers and drug 
traffickers. However the results have not 
been impressive so far. Having impounded 
consignments of cash passing through 
Hawala networks, it is easy to generate 
headline-grabbing reports about the 
destruction of the financial sinews of 
terrorist and drug-smuggling operations. 
But if no terrorists or drug-smugglers are 
apprehended as the outcome of such 
interventions, and if heroin becomes so 
plentiful that its street price declines, 
shaking down Hawaladars begins to look 
more like a public relations exercise. 
 
If my analysis is correct, most transactions 
routed through Hawala networks provide a 
much needed financial service to millions 
of migrant workers who need a cheap and 
reliable means of sending money back 
home. It may well be that some ‘dirty 
money’ gets inserted into the huge flows 
of value passing through the hawala 
system, but the same is also undoubtedly 
true of the mainstream banking system. 
The challenge here is to find an effective 
means of separating the sheep from the 
goats. In their efforts to do so the 
regulatory authorities, under pressure from 
the US Treasury, appear to have armed 
those who guard the gates of financial 
rectitude with blunderbusses rather than 
stilettos. In these circumstances it should 
come as no surprise that whist their 
blunderbusses are inflicting considerable 
collateral damage, the goats have become 
yet more skilled at evading surveillance 
and for the most part slip though 
undetected. 
 
The authorities’ chances of success would 
have been greater had they formulated 
their strategies with a better appreciation 
of the character, location and modus 
operandi of their targets. Merely driving 
the system underground – the currently 
preferred tactic – favours criminals much 
more than their pursuers, providing we 
remember that the real targets here are 
terrorists and drug smugglers, rather than 
those alleged to be providing them with 
financial services. Rather than succumbing 
to mindless moral panic, might not the 
authorities make much greater progress if 
they sought the cooperation of hawaladars, 
rather than subjecting them to random 
prosecution on specious grounds? If some 
‘dirty money’ does indeed seek to pass 
through the system – as is manifestly a 
possibility – no-one is better placed than 
Hawaladars to point intelligent 
investigators to its source; however there 
is little chance of them volunteering such 
information if their normal commercial 
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